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Chapter 9 Plan Confirmation Standards and the
Role of State Choices
JULIET M. MORINGIELLO*
ABSTRACT
Because so few municipalities have ever filed for bankruptcy, the Chapter 9
confirmation standards have not benefitted from extensive judicial scrutiny.
The standards are particularly undeveloped as applied to cities and
counties, whose debt structure and service obligations are more
complicated and diverse than those of the special-purpose districts, whose
cases generate the vast majority of Chapter 9 judicial opinions. The lack
of clarity is not only bad for distressed cities and their creditors, but it is
also undesirable from a public-policy standpoint. States can choose
whether to permit their municipalities to file for bankruptcy. Clear plan
confirmation standards can inform a state’s decision whether to permit
filing and its fashioning of a municipal financial distress resolution
program.
This Article explores the relationship between the unique structure and
goals of Chapter 9 and its confirmation standards in the context of the plan
confirmation issues that arose in Stockton and Detroit. Congress designed
municipal bankruptcy law to assist states in resolving the financial distress
of their municipalities. Although several courts have made clear that once
a municipality files for bankruptcy, the Supremacy Clause renders
ineffective state laws governing priorities, little attention has been paid to
the amount of deference that a court should give to choices that a state
makes during a municipality’s bankruptcy that affect the treatment of
creditors. This Article proposes a clearer role for state choices in the
bankruptcy process, but concedes that because states do not always
participate in the financial rehabilitation of their cities, a clearer role for
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the state may not always be the answer to interpreting the Chapter 9
confirmation standards.
INTRODUCTION
Recent media headlines notwithstanding, Chapter 9 bankruptcies
remain rare. Since municipal bankruptcy first entered federal law in 1934,
fewer than 700 cases have been filed.1 It is even more rare for a generalpurpose municipality to seek bankruptcy protection; between 1980 and
2012, only forty-nine cities, counties, and towns had done so.2 Detroit’s
bankruptcy filing was particularly historic; in terms of outstanding debt, it
was by far the largest municipal bankruptcy ever filed.3 Detroit’s
bankruptcy is in some ways unique. The city’s iconic status in American
manufacturing history ensured that even the international media would pay
attention to the case.4 Its severe population decline leaves Detroit with a
geographical footprint that exceeds the needs of its residents.5 Most
interesting to the nonexpert is Detroit’s art. Unlike most museums, the
Detroit Institute of Art (DIA) is owned by the city, and the collection may
be worth at least a billion dollars.6 Even nonlawyers debated whether
Detroit should be able to keep its art if it cannot pay its creditors in full.7
1. See FRANCIS J. LAWALL & J. GREGG MILLER, DEBT ADJUSTMENTS FOR
MUNICIPALITIES UNDER CHAPTER 9 OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE: A COLLIER MONOGRAPH § 1,
at 5 (2012) (reporting that between 1934 and 2012, fewer than 650 municipalities had filed
for bankruptcy).
2. JAMES E. SPIOTTO, CHAPMAN & CUTLER LLP, PRIMER ON MUNICIPAL DEBT
ADJUSTMENT C-3 (2012), available at http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-frankel/files/2013/12/
chapmanandcutlerchapter9.pdf.
3. Matthew Dolan, Record Bankruptcy for Detroit, WALL ST. J. (July 19, 2013, 6:32
AM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142412788732399380457861414417370
9204.
4. See, e.g., David Taylor, Detroit Declared Officially Bankrupt as Judge Rejects
Appeal, TIMES (London) (last updated Dec. 4, 2013, 12:01 AM), http://www.thetimes.co.
uk/tto/news/world/americas/article3939315.ece.
5. Nate Cohn, The Decline of Detroit in Five Maps, NEW REPUBLIC (July 18, 2013),
http://www.newrepublic.com/article/113946/detroit-bankruptcy-2013-maps-numbers.
6. Estimates of the collection’s value range from $1.1 billion to more than $4 billion.
See Mark Stryker, DIA Collection Worth Up to $4.6 Billion, New Report Says, DETROIT
FREE PRESS (July 9, 2014, 11:33 PM), http://archive.freep.com/article/20140709/ENT05/30
7090111/DIA-arts-Detroit-Artvest-valuation-billions.
7. See, e.g., Peter Schjeldahl, Should Detroit Sell Its Art?, NEW YORKER (July 24,
2013), http://www.newyorker.com/culture/culture-desk/should-detroit-sell-its-art (recommending that Detroit sell its collection); Peter Schjeldahl, What Should Detroit Do With Its
Art?: The Sequel, NEW YORKER (July 26, 2013), http://www.newyorker.com/culture/culture
-desk/what-should-detroit-do-with-its-art-the-sequel (retracting the recommendation that Detroit
sell its collection).
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Detroit’s bankruptcy proceeded more quickly and smoothly than many
people expected, with the court approving the city’s plan of adjustment8
fewer than sixteen months after the case was filed.9 One of the many
settlements contributing to the speed of Detroit’s case10 was the “Grand
Bargain,” through which a group of private foundations and the State of
Michigan promised to contribute hundreds of millions of dollars to keep the
art in Detroit and to pay Detroit’s retirees a substantial percentage of what
they are owed for pension obligations.11 Detroit’s retirees are only one
group of unsecured creditors of the city, and the confirmed plan pays them
a higher percentage of their claims than it does to other unsecured
creditors.12 During the case, other creditors claimed that the court could
not confirm a plan of adjustment incorporating the Grand Bargain because
such a plan would “discriminate unfairly” against a class of creditors, in
contravention of Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code (the Code).13
Although the Grand Bargain and the property at stake are unique,
Detroit was not alone among insolvent cities in paying one group of
unsecured creditors a significantly higher percentage of their claims against
the city than another over creditor objections. At the same time that the
8. A plan of adjustment is the Chapter 9 counterpart to the Chapter 11 plan of
reorganization. See 11 U.S.C. § 941 (2012).
9. Detroit filed for Chapter 9 bankruptcy relief on July 18, 2013. See Voluntary
Petition, In re City of Detroit, No. 13-53846 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. July 18, 2013), available at
http://www.mieb.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/notices/City%20of%20Detroit%20Chapter
%209%20Petition.pdf; see also Press Release, U.S. Bankr. Ct. for the E. Dist. of Mich. (July
18, 2013), http://www.mieb.uscourts.gov/news/city-detroit-bankruptcy-filing. The oral
opinion was then entered just under sixteen months later on November 7, 2014. See Oral
Opinion on the Record, In re City of Detroit, No. 13-53846 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Nov. 7,
2014) [hereinafter Detroit Confirmation Opinion], available at http://www.mieb.uscourts.
gov/sites/default/files/notices/Oral_Opinion_on_Detroit_Plan_Confirmation_Judge_Rhodes
_FINAL_for_Release.pdf.
10. See Melissa B. Jacoby, The Detroit Bankruptcy, Pre-Eligibility, 41 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 849, 861–64 (2014) (explaining that Judge Rhodes favored mediation over litigation
during the case to promote Detroit’s recovery, and noting the ambitious timeline that the
judge set for the case).
11. Jonathan Oosting, Michigan Senate Approves ‘Grand Bargain’ in Detroit
Bankruptcy Case, $195M for Pensions, MICH. LIVE (June 3, 2014, 7:16 PM),
http://www.mlive.com/lansing-news/index.ssf/2014/06/michigan_senate_approves_histo.
html.
12. Detroit Confirmation Opinion, supra note 9, at 28–29.
13. Financial Guaranty Insurance Co.’s Pretrial Brief in Support of Objection to Plan
for the Adjustment of Debts of the City of Detroit, In re City of Detroit, No. 13-53846
(Bankr. E.D. Mich. Aug. 27, 2014). FGIC ultimately settled with Detroit and withdrew its
objections to the plan. See Lisa Lambert, Major Settlement Puts Detroit Closer to
Bankruptcy Exit, REUTERS (Oct. 16, 2014, 5:05 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/
10/16/us-usa-detroit-bankruptcy-fgic-idUSKCN0I51RN20141016.
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court in Detroit was considering whether Detroit’s plan of adjustment
satisfied the Code’s confirmation standards, another bankruptcy court was
scrutinizing a different contested plan.14 A year before Detroit filed for
bankruptcy, the City of Stockton, California, filed.15 At the time, Stockton
was the most populous city ever to file for bankruptcy.16 More than two
years after Stockton filed, the court approved its plan of adjustment, under
which the city assumed its unfunded pension obligations to the California
Public Employee Retirement System (CalPERS), paying those obligations
in full, while paying a small percentage of other unsecured claims.17
Judicial approval of the Detroit and Stockton plans adds to the scant
body of case law applying the Chapter 9 confirmation standards. Both
opinions illustrate a careful consideration of the efforts made by the state
and city, in the case of Detroit, and by the city alone, in the case of
Stockton, to use bankruptcy law to ameliorate financial distress that they
could not remedy using only state law tools.18 Because so few
municipalities have ever filed for bankruptcy, these standards have not
benefitted from extensive judicial scrutiny.
They are particularly
undeveloped as applied to general-purpose municipalities, whose debt
structure and service obligations are more complicated and diverse than
those of the special-purpose districts, whose cases generate the vast

14. Because Detroit entered the confirmation stage with a dissenting class of creditors,
the court was forced to consider the cramdown standards. Stockton’s plan was accepted by
all classes, but not by all creditors, so the court had to apply fewer standards. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 943 (2012) (setting forth Chapter 9 confirmation standards and incorporating selected
Chapter 11 standards); id. § 1129(b) (setting forth cramdown standards).
15. Voluntary Petition, In re City of Stockton, No. 12-32118 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. June 28,
2012), available at http://www.caeb.uscourts.gov/documents/Forms/Misc/Voluntary%20
Petition%20-%20City%20of%20Stockton.pdf; see also Bobby White, Stockton Files for
Bankruptcy Protection, WALL ST. J. (June 29, 2012, 9:48 AM), http://online.wsj.com/news/
article_email/SB10001424052702304058404577495412282335228-lMyQjAxMTA0MDEw
NzExNDcyWj.
16. See White, supra note 15.
17. Katy Stech & Dan Fitzpatrick, Judge Approves California City’s Bankruptcy-Exit
Plan, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 30, 2014, 5:00 PM), http://online.wsj.com/articles/stockton-faceskey-ruling-on-bankruptcy-1414679337. The court confirmed the plan over the objection of
an unsecured creditor who argued that the plan violated several Chapter 9 plan confirmation
standards. See Summary Objection of Franklin High Yield Tax-Free Income Fund and
Franklin California High Yield Municipal Fund to Confirmation of First Amended Plan of
Adjustment of Debts of City of Stockton, California, In re City of Stockton, No. 12-32118
(Bankr. E.D. Cal. Feb. 26, 2014).
18. See generally Detroit Confirmation Opinion, supra note 9; Stech & Fitzpatrick,
supra note 17.

http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol37/iss1/4

4

Moringiello: Chapter 9 Plan Confirmation Standards and the Role of State Choic

2015]

CHAPTER 9 PLAN CONFIRMATION STANDARDS

75

majority of Chapter 9 judicial opinions.19 The lack of clarity is not only
bad for distressed cities and their creditors, but it is also undesirable from a
public policy standpoint. States can choose whether to permit their
municipalities to file for bankruptcy. Clear plan confirmation standards
can inform a state in deciding whether to permit filing20 and developing a
municipal financial distress resolution program.21
This Article explores the relationship between the unique structure
and goals of Chapter 9 and its confirmation standards. Specifically, this
Article focuses on the general-purpose municipality—the city, county, or
town—as debtor. A city’s bankruptcy affects individuals in a deeply
personal way, as residents relying on city services, as commuters spending
their workdays in the city, as city employees, and as suburban residents
who may or may not see the fortunes of their communities as linked to
those of the bankrupt city. Moreover, states have a particular interest in the
financial reputation of their cities; as Michigan’s largest city, Detroit’s
reputation is intertwined with that of the state.
As this Article explains in more detail below, Congress designed
municipal bankruptcy law to assist states in resolving the financial distress
of their municipalities.22 In another article, I explained that Congress
designed Chapter 9 to encourage a state–federal partnership to alleviate
municipal financial distress.23 This Article examines how that partnership
purpose might inform courts in interpreting the Chapter 9 confirmation
standards. Although several courts have made clear that once a
municipality files for bankruptcy, the Supremacy Clause renders ineffective
state laws governing priorities,24 little attention has been paid to the amount
of deference that a court should give to choices that a state makes during a
municipality’s bankruptcy that affect the treatment of creditors. To frame
19. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(40) (defining municipality); id. § 109(c) (stating that an entity
is permitted to file under Chapter 9 only if it is a municipality); see also SPIOTTO, supra note
2, at C-3.
20. A municipality cannot seek bankruptcy relief unless it is specifically authorized by
its state to do so. See 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(2); see also Juliet M. Moringiello, Specific
Authorization to File Under Chapter 9: Lessons from Harrisburg, 32 CAL. BANKR. J. 237,
255–59 (2012).
21. See Juliet M. Moringiello, Goals and Governance in Municipal Bankruptcy, 71
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 403, 461–78 (2014) [hereinafter Moringiello, Goals and Governance]
(discussing state intervention programs).
22. See infra notes 25–37 and accompanying text.
23. See generally Moringiello, Goals and Governance, supra note 21.
24. Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 2376 v. City of Vallejo (In re City of Vallejo),
432 B.R. 262, 268–70 (E.D. Cal. 2010); In re City of Detroit, 504 B.R. 191, 254–55 (Bankr.
E.D. Mich. 2013); Cnty. of Orange v. Merrill Lynch & Co. (In re Cnty. of Orange), 191
B.R. 1005, 1017 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1996).
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the discussion about the relationship between the goals of Chapter 9 and its
confirmation standards, Part I provides a short history of Chapter 9 and a
review of its confirmation standards. Part II discusses how bankruptcy
rules are generally driven by the type of person (entity or individual) that is
affected by them. Part III discusses how the structure of Chapter 9 should
shape the Chapter 9 confirmation standards. The conclusion advocates for
a clearer role for state choices in the bankruptcy process, but concedes that
because states do not always participate in the financial rehabilitation of
their cities, a clearer role for the state may not always be the answer to
interpreting the Chapter 9 confirmation standards.
I.

A.

AN OVERVIEW OF CHAPTER 9 AND ITS PLAN CONFIRMATION
STANDARDS
A Delicate Constitutional Balance

Congress enacted the first predecessor to Chapter 925 as emergency
legislation in the wake of the Great Depression.26 When the Supreme
Court upheld Chapter 9’s predecessor in 1938,27 it justified a federal
municipal bankruptcy law by noting the inability of any state to resolve the
financial distress of its municipalities on its own. States are restricted in
doing so by the Contracts Clause of the United States Constitution, which
prohibits a state from impairing the obligation of contracts.28 Yet the
federal bankruptcy process as applied to municipalities is cabined by
principles of state sovereignty expressed in the Tenth Amendment to the
Constitution, which reserves to the states or the people all powers not
explicitly granted to the federal government nor prohibited to the states.29
A municipality is created by and continues to exist at the pleasure of its

25. Act of Aug. 16, 1937, ch. 657, 50 Stat. 653 (current version codified in scattered
sections of 11 U.S.C.).
26. See Moringiello, Goals and Governance, supra note 21, at 440–41 (recognizing that
preceding the Great Depression, “municipal securities were more widely distributed among
investors than they had ever been” as a result of “[t]housands of municipalities default[ing]
on their debt obligations” during the Depression). This, combined with the fact that about
7% of all outstanding municipal debt was in default, showed that a federal solution was
necessary. Id. at 441.
27. United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27, 51–52 (1938) (upholding the Act of Aug. 16,
1937, ch. 657, 50 Stat. 653, and emphasizing cooperation between the state and federal
government to resolve municipal fiscal failure).
28. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
29. Id. amend. X (reserving to the states or the people all powers not explicitly granted
to the federal government nor prohibited to the states).
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state.30 The structure of Chapter 9 recognizes this constitutional balance in
its limitations on a bankruptcy court’s powers over a municipal debtor.
This delicate constitutional balance provides the architecture of
Chapter 9. Today’s Chapter 9 is an amalgam of original provisions and
provisions incorporated from other bankruptcy chapters. It imports
selected parts of Chapters 3, 5, and 11 through § 901, and adopts rules
tailored to municipal bankruptcy in the remainder of its sections.
The Code limits a court’s powers over a municipality both by
omission and by express commands. Many of Chapter 11’s debtoroversight provisions are absent from Chapter 9. For example, a court may
not appoint a trustee or examiner in a Chapter 9 case, and a municipal
debtor may use or dispose of municipal property without court approval.31
Although these omissions appear to create a governance vacuum, Chapter 9
expresses its deference to state control over municipalities in two ways.
The Code recognizes the primacy of a state’s powers over its municipalities
by stating that Chapter 9 does not limit the power of any state to control its
municipalities in their political or governmental powers, including
expenditures for municipal services.32 Chapter 9 also prohibits the court
from interfering with any of the municipal debtor’s political or
governmental powers, its property, and its revenues, unless the debtor
consents or provides for such interference in its plan of adjustment.33
Congress adopted §§ 903 and 904 in deference to the Supreme Court’s
opinion in National League of Cities v. Usery,34 which held that Congress
may not use its powers under the Commerce Clause to “force directly upon
the States its choices as to how essential decisions regarding the conduct of
integral governmental functions are to be made.”35 The Usery decision
pronounced a stronger role for the states in our federal system than had
been recognized at the time Congress enacted the original bankruptcy
legislation.36 Thus, in enacting §§ 903 and 904, Congress clarified its

30. Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178–79 (1907), overruled on other
grounds by Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
31. See 11 U.S.C. § 901 (2012) (omitting §§ 363 and 1104 from Chapter 9).
32. Id. § 903.
33. Id. § 904.
34. Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San
Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
35. Id. at 855; see also H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 262–63 (1977), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6220–21.
36. See Bernard Schwartz, National League of Cities v. Usery—The Commerce Power
and State Sovereignty Redivivus, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 1115, 1115 (1978) (explaining that
Usery was the first case since the 1930s in which the Court struck down an exercise of
congressional action under the Commerce Clause).
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intention that the bankruptcy court should not interfere with a state’s
governmental powers.
The effect of this constitutional balance on the Chapter 9 confirmation
standards remains unclear. Although the legislative history to the 1976
Amendments to municipal bankruptcy law indicates that Congress codified
a policy of noninterference with municipal powers in response to Usery,
that decision was overruled less than ten years later in a decision that
rejected the notion that states are immune from federal interference in the
performance of “integral” or “traditional” governmental functions.37 When
a state permits its cities to file for bankruptcy, it is permitting its cities to
take advantage of a federal process. Ideally, as was the case in Detroit, the
state will play a role in that process. How much say a state can have in the
particulars of that federal process as applied to one of its cities is an open
question that this Article explores below.
B.

Some Standards Imported from Chapter 11, Some Not

The confirmation standards reflect the patchwork structure of Chapter
9. Some of the confirmation standards are expressly stated in Chapter 9,
and others are imported directly from Chapter 11. All plans, whether they
are cramdown plans or not, must be proposed in good faith,38 be in the best
interest of creditors, and be feasible.39 The first of those standards is
imported from Chapter 11, and the other two are stated explicitly in
Chapter 9. The requirement that a court can confirm a cramdown plan only
if the plan does not discriminate unfairly and is fair and equitable with
respect to dissenting creditor classes is incorporated into Chapter 9 from
Chapter 11.40
The Code allows a court to confirm a Chapter 9 plan only if the debtor
proposed the plan in good faith.41 Courts in Chapter 11 cases find good
faith when there is “a reasonable likelihood that the plan will achieve a
result consistent with the objectives and purposes of the Bankruptcy
Code.”42 Courts applying this test in Chapter 9 cases acknowledge that
they must consider the “governmental nature and obligations” of a
municipal debtor.43 Very few courts have elaborated on the good faith

37. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 546–47.
38. 11 U.S.C. § 943(b)(1) (incorporating § 1129(a)(3) through reference to § 901).
39. Id. § 943(b)(7).
40. See id. § 901(a) (incorporating §§ 1129(b)(1), (2)(A)–(B)).
41. Id. § 943(b)(1) (incorporating § 1129(a)(3)).
42. In re Madison Hotel Assocs., 749 F.2d 410, 425 (7th Cir. 1984) (quoting In re Nite
Lite Inns, 17 B.R. 367, 370 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1982)).
43. In re Mount Carbon Metro. Dist., 242 B.R. 18, 41 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1999).
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requirement. Consistent with Chapter 9’s deference to state and municipal
choices, one court found good faith when a plan maximized creditor
recoveries “in the most practicable way given the unusual and complex
nature” of the bankruptcy case.44 On the other hand, where a plan proposed
by a metropolitan taxing district appeared to benefit one creditor, a
developer in the district, to the detriment of the other creditors, the court
found bad faith because it viewed the plan as a ploy to “harness a
governmental entity’s taxing power for private profit.”45
The Chapter 9 best interests test exemplifies some of the difficulties in
translating corporate and individual bankruptcy concepts to the municipal
bankruptcy context. In corporate and individual bankruptcy cases, the best
interests test is satisfied if each dissenting creditor receives at least as much
in a reorganization plan as it would if all of the debtor’s assets were
liquidated and distributed to creditors.46 Municipal bankruptcy law does
not seek to distribute a municipality’s monetary value to its creditors;47
therefore, the Chapter 9 best interests test is not based on the value of
municipal assets. Courts interpret the Chapter 9 best interests test to
require only that “a proposed plan provide a better alternative for creditors
than what they already have,”48 meaning that the creditors would fare better
under the plan than they would outside of bankruptcy. Because only the
debtor itself can propose a plan,49 the alternative to confirmation of the
debtor’s plan is dismissal.50 Moreover, it is widely believed that no one
44. In re Barnwell Cnty. Hosp., 471 B.R. 849, 866 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2012).
45. In re Mount Carbon, 242 B.R. at 42.
46. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1129(a)(7), 1325(a)(4). In Chapter 13, creditors do not vote on the
plan, so all creditors must receive this liquidation value of their claims. Chapter 11 does not
use the term “best interests”; instead, it codifies the judicial interpretation of the former best
interests standard.
47. See Newhouse v. Corcoran Irrigation Dist., 114 F.2d 690, 690–91 (9th Cir. 1940)
(explaining that because a municipal bankruptcy is very different from that of a private
entity, the business bankruptcy principle that an entity’s assets should be applied to its debts
in bankruptcy is inapplicable in a municipal bankruptcy).
48. In re Mount Carbon, 242 B.R. at 34.
49. 11 U.S.C. § 901 (omitting § 1121(c)—which gives parties other than the debtor the
authority to file a plan of reorganization—from Chapter 9); id. § 941 (giving the debtor the
authority to file the plan of adjustment). State law determines who can act for the debtor,
and in some states, an official appointed by the state must develop and file the plan of
adjustment. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 141.1558(1) (2013).
50. Cnty. of Orange v. Merrill Lynch & Co. (In re Cnty. of Orange), 191 B.R. 1005,
1020 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1996) (quoting 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 943.03[7], at 943-40 to
-41 (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed. 1996) (stating that to satisfy the best interests test, the
Chapter 9 debtor must propose a plan that is “a better alternative to the creditors than
dismissal of the case”)); In re Sanitary & Improvement Dist., No. 7, 98 B.R. 970, 975–76
(Bankr. D. Neb. 1989) (finding that the plan met the best interests test because dismissal
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can force the sale of any municipal assets outside of bankruptcy;51
therefore, upon dismissal of the case, creditors will be forced to resort to
mandamus actions to attempt to compel municipal officials to pay their
claims out of tax collections or to raise sufficient taxes to pay their
judgments.52 If, upon dismissal, creditors will be left with lawsuits and
ineffective collection remedies, almost any Chapter 9 plan will be better
than the dismissal alternative. One court recognized as much when, in
ruling that a plan met the best interests test, it acknowledged that all
creditors would be harmed if they were sent back to a state court system
that had no power to compromise debts without the consent of all parties.53
Both Chapter 9 and Chapter 11 contain a confirmation standard that
requires the court to look into the future. A court can confirm a Chapter 9
plan only if it finds that the plan is feasible.54 Chapter 11 has an analogous
forward-looking test that is designed to ensure that the plan of
reorganization is not followed by the debtor’s liquidation (unless
contemplated by the plan) or a future need for financial restructuring.55
Like the Chapter 11 feasibility standard, Chapter 9 feasibility requires an
assessment of the future; but in looking to the future under Chapter 9,
courts consider the unique purpose of a municipal entity. A plan is feasible
if the court finds that the debtor can make payments under the plan and
provide “future public services at the level necessary to its viability as a
municipality.”56 One court has described the relationship between the best
interests test and the feasibility test as a floor and a ceiling: the best
interests test requires, as a floor, that the debtor make a reasonable attempt
at payment, and the feasibility test provides a ceiling by preventing the
debtor from promising too much.57

would result in creditors pursuing mandamus actions to raise taxes which, even if increased,
would not be sufficient to pay bondholders).
51. See infra notes 139–46, 148 and accompanying text.
52. See Moringiello, Goals and Governance, supra note 21, at 442–43 (discussing the
mandamus remedy and its deficiencies).
53. In re Sanitary & Improvement Dist., 98 B.R. at 976; see also In re Mount Carbon,
242 B.R. at 34 (acknowledging that because of the inefficacy of creditor remedies against a
municipality outside of bankruptcy, any payment in bankruptcy could be viewed as a better
alternative than dismissal).
54. 11 U.S.C. § 943(b)(7).
55. Id. § 1129(a)(11).
56. In re Mount Carbon, 242 B.R. at 35; see also In re Connector 2000 Ass’n, 447 B.R.
752, 766 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2011) (finding the plan to be feasible because the municipal debtor
would be able to pay its plan obligations and maintain its operations).
57. In re Mount Carbon, 242 B.R. at 34 (citing 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note
50, ¶ 943.03[7], at 943-39 to -41).
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Chapter 9 imports its twin-pronged cramdown test directly from
Chapter 11. Under that test, a court can confirm a plan of adjustment over
the objection of a dissenting class of creditors if the plan is fair and
equitable and does not discriminate unfairly against creditors.58 The two
components of the test reflect the capital structure of a business, the
priorities among creditors both inside and outside of bankruptcy, and the
bankruptcy principle of equal treatment of similarly situated creditors.59
The requirement that a plan be fair and equitable acknowledges the
existence of payment priorities. It recognizes creditor property interests
created under state law by requiring that secured claims be paid in full, and
it recognizes the capital structure of businesses by requiring that unsecured
creditors be paid in full before the entity’s owners can receive anything.60
Because a municipality has no shareholders, this absolute priority rule is
inapplicable in Chapter 9. The definition of “fair and equitable” in Chapter
9 is therefore as elusive as the definition of “best interests.” Of the very
few courts that have had the opportunity to define “fair and equitable” for
Chapter 9 purposes, one held that a plan was fair and equitable when it
provided the creditors with all that they could reasonably expect under the
circumstances,61 a standard that appears to be identical to the Chapter 9
best interests standard articulated by some courts.62 Congress recognized
the redundant nature of the two tests in enacting the 1976 amendments to
the municipal bankruptcy law, which omitted the best interests test.63 At
least one court has applied the absolute priority rule in a municipal
bankruptcy case, finding that a debt adjustment plan for a hospital district
was fair and equitable because no holders of equity interests in the hospital
district received anything.64 The hospital district, however, had no equity
owners.65

58. 11 U.S.C. § 901 (incorporating 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) into Chapter 9).
59. See Comm. on Bankr. & Corporate Reorganization of the Ass’n of the Bar of
N.Y.C., Making the Test for Unfair Discrimination More “Fair”: A Proposal, 58 BUS.
LAW. 83, 87–88 (2002) (listing the different tests that courts use in Chapter 11 cases).
60. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2).
61. Lorber v. Vista Irrigation Dist., 127 F.2d 628, 639 (9th Cir. 1942) (citing Bekins v.
Lindsay-Strathmore Irrigation Dist., 114 F.2d 680, 685 (9th Cir. 1940)).
62. See supra notes 46–53 and accompanying text.
63. See Act of Apr. 8, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-260, 90 Stat. 315 (current version codified
in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.); see also In re Mount Carbon Metro. Dist., 242 B.R. 18,
33–34 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1999); Kenneth W. Bond, Municipal Bankruptcy Under the 1976
Amendments to Chapter IX of the Bankruptcy Act, 5 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1, 24 (1976).
64. In re Corcoran Hosp. Dist., 233 B.R. 449, 458–59 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1999).
65. Id. at 458.
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Even in Chapter 11 cases, courts differ as to how to determine when a
plan discriminates unfairly against creditors.66 Unlike the fair and equitable
test, which preserves creditor expectations related to the vertical capital
structure of an organization, the unfair discrimination test preserves
horizontal parity among creditors holding identical payment priorities.67 In
Chapter 11 cases, courts have struggled to determine the fairness of
discrimination among creditors with the same priority status. A handful of
courts have held that all discrimination is unfair.68 Some apply a broad
reasonableness test that considers whether the discrimination is proposed in
good faith and is necessary to the reorganization in order to allow greater
recovery to creditors such as suppliers (on the basis that trade credit is
necessary to the continued vitality of the debtor)69 and unionized
employees (on the theory that they might strike).70 Others presume that all
discrimination is unfair unless the proposed distribution is based on
prebankruptcy expectations, or the favored creditor provided some value to
the reorganization effort.71
Few courts in municipal bankruptcy cases have had the opportunity to
vet the unfair discrimination standard. Two Supreme Court cases from the
1940s support the position that discrimination is fair if the creditor
receiving better treatment provides commensurate value to the

66. See Comm. on Bankr. & Corporate Reorganization, supra note 59, at 87–88 (listing
the different tests that courts use in Chapter 11 cases).
67. See Bruce A. Markell, A New Perspective on Unfair Discrimination in Chapter 11,
72 AM. BANKR. L.J. 227, 227–28 (1998) (“[U]nfair discrimination is best viewed as a
horizontal limit on nonconsensual confirmation, in contrast to the vertical limit imposed by
the requirement that a nonconsensual plan be ‘fair and equitable.’”); Stephen L. Sepinuck,
Rethinking Unfair Discrimination in Chapter 13, 74 AM. BANKR. L.J. 341, 348 (2000) (“[I]t
seems fairly clear that the unfair discrimination standard is intended to maintain equity
among creditors of the same priority, much as the fair and equitable requirement preserves
equity among creditors of different priorities.”).
68. See In re Greystone III Joint Venture, 102 B.R. 560, 567 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1989)
(discussing various courts’ use of a rigid test for classification of claims), rev’d sub nom.
Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Greystone III Joint Venture (In re Greystone III Joint
Venture), 995 F.2d 1274 (5th Cir. 1991); see also Comm. on Bankr. & Corporate
Reorganization, supra note 59, at 87–88 (explaining that few courts have accepted this
restrictive approach).
69. Creekstone Apartments Assocs., L.P. v. Resolution Trust Corp. (In re Creekstone
Apartments Assocs., L.P.), 168 B.R. 639, 645 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1994).
70. In re Kliegl Bros. Universal Elec. Stage Lighting Co., 149 B.R. 306, 309 (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y. 1992).
71. See In re Sentry Operating Co. of Tex., 264 B.R. 850, 864 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2001)
(finding unfair discrimination).
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reorganization effort.72 Since the 1940s, only a handful of courts have
considered the unfair discrimination standard in a Chapter 9 case, and those
approving discrimination among creditors of equal priority continue to do
so based on contributions to the reorganization effort.73 Therefore, in a
case involving a hospital district, the court approved the separate
classification of and higher payment to a medical group because the group
had entered into a settlement agreement with the debtor that ended
litigation between the parties and reduced the claim of the medical group.74
The court found that the classification was justified and, in turn, that the
plan did not unfairly discriminate against other creditors because it
believed that, had the debtor been required to continue the litigation, it
would not have been able to propose a feasible plan.75
Three guiding principles mark the plan confirmation standards. The
first, embedded in the best interests test, is that a baseline minimum
payment must be made to all creditors.76 The second principle, that there is
a hierarchy of creditor claims and equity interests, is expressed in the
requirement that a plan be fair and equitable.77 The “no unfair
discrimination” test codifies the last principle, that creditors of equal rank
must receive equal treatment.78 All of these principles reflect both well-

72. Mason v. Paradise Irrigation Dist., 326 U.S. 536, 541–42 (1946) (citing Ecker v. W.
Pac. R.R. Corp., 318 U.S. 448, 486–87 (1943)); Am. United Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. City of
Avon Park, 311 U.S. 138, 144 (1940) (finding unfair discrimination in a plan that gave one
of the bondholders, the city’s funding agent, better treatment than others because the debtor
had not shown that the funding agent’s services justified the extra value given to it in the
plan); see also Case v. L.A. Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106, 117, 121–22 (1939) (finding
no unfair discrimination in a plan giving the Reconstruction Finance Corp. (RFC) better
treatment than other bondholders because the RFC had underwritten the plan of adjustment
and had provided the capital necessary to effectuate the plan); Markell, supra note 67, at
233 (asserting, in support of the test for unfair discrimination that now bears his name, that
these two cases are “telling as to the core content of unfair discrimination”).
73. In re Corcoran Hosp. Dist., 233 B.R. 449, 457 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1999) (holding that
a cramdown plan did not discriminate against a dissenting class, but justifying its holding on
the standards for claim classification rather than those for unfair discrimination); see also
Richard M. Hynes & Steven D. Walt, Fair and Unfair Discrimination in Municipal
Bankruptcy, 37 CAMPBELL L. REV. 25 (2015); Andrew B. Dawson, Pensioners,
Bondholders, and Unfair Discrimination in Municipal Bankruptcy 25 (Aug. 18, 2014)
(unpublished manuscript) (quoting Markell, supra note 67, at 254), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2482608.
74. In re Corcoran Hosp. Dist., 233 B.R. at 456.
75. Id.
76. See supra notes 46–53 and accompanying text.
77. See supra notes 60–63 and accompanying text.
78. See supra notes 66–71 and accompanying text.
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understood nonbankruptcy rules regarding creditor entitlements and
bankruptcy policies that alter those entitlements.
It is tempting to apply judicial interpretations of Chapter 11
confirmation standards to Chapter 9 plans. To some authors, this is a
necessary exercise, because the Chapter 9 standards are either imported
directly from Chapter 11 or use words that are well understood in the
business bankruptcy context.79 Others believe that even if the language
used in different chapters is identical, the interpretation of the language
must be tailored to the type of debtor.80 I side with the second approach.
Bankruptcy law is necessarily tied to the nature of the debtor, and uses the
characteristics of the debtor as the foundation for its rules. The application
of statutory standards takes place within a theory and policy framework,
yet theory cannot be separated from “the parties that it reacts to and acts
upon.”81 The next Part discusses how the unique attributes of each broad
category of debtor—business entity, individual, and municipality—affected
the development of the goals and rules governing that category of debtor.
II.

INDIVIDUALS, BUSINESS ENTITIES, MUNICIPALITIES, AND
BANKRUPTCY’S GOALS

The laws governing different types of debtors outside of bankruptcy
inform the Bankruptcy Code’s rules and structure. In all bankruptcy
chapters, the property rights of and claims against the debtor are
determined in the first instance by state law.82 Upon filing, bankruptcy law
takes over and modifies those rights and distributes the value of the
debtor’s assets according to bankruptcy policy that is tailored to the type of
debtor involved.83 Below is a brief summary of significant ways in which

79. See, e.g., Richard M. Hynes & Steven D. Walt, Pensions and Property Rights in
Municipal Bankruptcy, 33 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 609, 637–38 (2014).
80. Sepinuck, supra note 67, at 348–50.
81. Lawrence Ponoroff, Enlarging the Bargaining Table: Some Implications of the
Corporate Stakeholder Model for Federal Bankruptcy Proceedings, 23 CAP. U. L. REV. 441,
453 (1994).
82. See Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979).
83. Juliet M. Moringiello, (Mis)use of State Law in Bankruptcy: The Hanging
Paragraph Story, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 963, 987–89. Several commentators have noted that
the rules of Chapter 11 are based primarily on policies best suited to large, publicly traded
corporations and assets, and that other types of Chapter 11 debtors require adjustments to
well-understood bankruptcy norms to tailor to their situations. See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird
& Edward R. Morrison, Serial Entrepreneurs and Small Business Bankruptcies, 105
COLUM. L. REV. 2310, 2310–15 (2005) (explaining that although the standard account of
Chapter 11 “begins with a fundamental insight of corporate finance,” the standard account is
irrelevant to small business bankruptcy, where the focus should be on the individual owner-
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business and consumer bankruptcy rules reflect the nature of business and
consumer debtors.
A.

Corporate Bankruptcy

Corporate bankruptcy policy and the rules implementing that policy
reflect the financial structure of business debtors and the goals and
purposes of business entity law. A company with no hope of rehabilitation
ideally will liquidate and pay creditors from the proceeds of that
liquidation.84 On the other hand, a viable business entity will reorganize
under Chapter 11, pay its creditors a going-concern premium that exceeds
the liquidation value of the company,85 and, if solvent (or if the owners of
the business contribute new value to the enterprise), will distribute some
value to its owners.86
The Chapter 11 confirmation standards reflect both these goals and
purposes and creditor expectations outside of bankruptcy. The best
interests of creditors test provides a floor for distribution by ensuring that
each creditor receives what it would receive upon liquidation of the
company, and the remaining confirmation standards govern how the
reorganization surplus is divided among the creditors.87 These remaining
standards incorporate both state-law rules and bankruptcy-specific rules.
The vertical priorities incorporate both bankruptcy-specific priorities
expressed in the Code, and selected state priorities, such as the property
rights granted to secured creditors and the rule that holders of equity
interests in business entities are paid after all creditors are paid.88 The
horizontal parity codified in the proscription against unfair discrimination

entrepreneur); Brian A. Blum, The Goals and Process of Reorganizing Small Businesses in
Bankruptcy, 4 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 181, 185 (2000) (explaining that the provisions
in Chapter 11 are based on assumptions more applicable to “publicly traded corporations
with complex business operations”); Pamela Foohey, Chapter 11 Reorganization and the
Fair and Equitable Standard: How the Absolute Priority Rule Applies to All Nonprofit
Entities, 86 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 31, 38–39 (2012) (expressing concern that the failure of
courts to explore the parallels between for-profit and nonprofit entities has stifled the
development of a fair and equitable standard that would further the goals of the Bankruptcy
Code for both types of corporations); Theresa J. Pulley Radwan, Keeping the Faith: The
Rights of Parishioners in Church Reorganizations, 82 WASH. L. REV. 75, 78–79 (2007)
(urging that parishioners be permitted to intervene in church bankruptcy proceedings).
84. BARRY E. ADLER, FOUNDATIONS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 108 (2005).
85. CHARLES JORDAN TABB, THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY § 1.2, at 6 (3d ed. 2014).
86. ADLER, supra note 84, at 108.
87. Markell, supra note 67, at 247.
88. 11 U.S.C. §§ 507, 1129(b) (2012).
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incorporates the bankruptcy policy of equal treatment of similarly situated
creditors.89
Because the nonbankruptcy treatment of creditors of a business entity
is well settled, the bankruptcy rules rest on a strong foundation. A secured
creditor has the right to foreclose on its collateral,90 and an unsecured
creditor must follow the procedures set forth in state law to collect any
judgment against an entity debtor. State law respects the choices of
corporate decision-makers; if they want to encumber all of the assets of the
entity with security interests, they can. Bankruptcy law similarly respects
these choices, with few exceptions.91 When bankruptcy law modifies state
entitlements in the business entity context, it operates from a recognized
starting point.
B.

Individual Bankruptcy

The foundations for individual bankruptcy are similarly well
established. Bankruptcy gives a fresh start to the honest but unfortunate
individual debtor.92 A Chapter 13 plan must also pay each creditor at least
what it would receive upon liquidation of the debtor’s assets.93 The rules
governing the collection of debts from an individual outside of bankruptcy
are as clear as those governing the collection of debts from an entity.
Outside of the bankruptcy context, the law places few limits on an
individual’s ability to encumber her property, but it restricts the ability of
unsecured creditors to seize property to satisfy their claims.94 The
exemption laws that prohibit judgment creditors from seizing the debtor’s
necessities are debtor protection laws that ensure that a debtor retains
enough to live productively. Bankruptcy law respects this notion that an
individual needs some property for her fresh start.95 If the individual
debtor liquidates her property, she is permitted to keep her exempt property
to begin her postbankruptcy life.96 Otherwise, creditor payment is based, in
the first instance, on nonbankruptcy expectations, modified to incorporate

89. See TABB, supra note 85, § 7.7, at 662, 664 (explaining the equality principle).
90. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-610(a) (2012).
91. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 510(c) (allowing a court to equitably subordinate claims).
92. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934).
93. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4).
94. Every state has statutes that protect the property of individual debtors from seizure
to satisfy judgments obtained by unsecured creditors. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§ 704.010–.210 (West 2009); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8124 (2014).
95. 11 U.S.C. § 522.
96. Id.
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bankruptcy policy. Unsecured claims receive pro rata treatment, unless
Congress deemed them worthy of priority status.97
The law governing corporate and individual bankruptcies rests on two
solid pillars. The first is a universally understood nonbankruptcy property
regime that provides certain baseline rights to creditors. The second is an
established set of bankruptcy goals that recognizes the nature of each type
of debtor. The Bankruptcy Code expresses its goals with respect to
business and individual bankruptcy in myriad provisions regarding
priorities,98 discharge,99 asset sales,100 debtor management,101 and
conversion of a reorganization to a liquidation if reorganization appears
unlikely.102
C.

Municipal Bankruptcy: Different Goals, Different Structure

The foundation on which municipal bankruptcy law is built was
designed to balance the needs of distressed municipalities with the
constitutional concerns affecting the relationship between states and the
federal government.103 The two strong pillars of corporate and individual
bankruptcy are absent from municipal bankruptcy for at least two reasons:
creditor rights in municipal assets are unclear, and municipal bankruptcy
happens so infrequently that courts have not enunciated the clear policies
that they have pronounced in corporate and individual cases.104 The
structure of Chapter 9 is also importantly different from that of Chapters 11
and 13. While the other bankruptcy chapters incorporate their policies in
specific Code provisions,105 Chapter 9 expresses its policy of minimal
federal intrusion into state affairs by omission. As explained earlier,
Chapter 9 allows no intrusion by the bankruptcy court in the exercise of a
state’s sovereign rights and duties vis à vis its cities.106 This policy
explains some of the missing Code sections, such as a priority section.107
97. Id. § 507(a)(3).
98. Id. § 507.
99. Id. §§ 523, 727, 1141, 1328.
100. Id. § 363.
101. Id. § 1104.
102. Id. § 1112.
103. See supra notes 25–37 and accompanying text.
104. See LAWALL & MILLER, supra note 1, § 1, at 5 (noting how few municipal
bankruptcies have been filed to date).
105. See supra notes 98–102 and accompanying text.
106. 11 U.S.C. § 904; In re Addison Cmty. Hosp. Auth., 175 B.R. 646, 649 (Bankr. E.D.
Mich. 1994); see also supra notes 29–36 and accompanying text.
107. Cnty. of Orange v. Merrill Lynch & Co. (In re Cnty. of Orange), 191 B.R. 1005,
1020 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1996).
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No one studies Chapter 9 until a major general-purpose municipality
files for bankruptcy, and that happens infrequently. Until several authors
wrote about the Chapter 9 plan confirmation standards in the wake of
Detroit’s filing,108 commentary about municipal bankruptcy law in the last
twenty-five years focused on whether Chapter 9 is effective at all, in part
because it appears to leave the debtor in control of its destiny, free from
judicial and statutory checks on its management.109 Although Chapter 9 is
not (yet) marked by the vigorous academic policy debates that surround the
other chapters of the Code, its founding principle assumes state oversight
and participation. From its earliest conception, the federal municipal
bankruptcy legislation anticipated state involvement in the municipality’s
fiscal affairs.110 When the Supreme Court upheld the second attempt at the
law in 1937, it expressed this policy of cooperation explicitly, explaining
that when a state authorizes one of its municipalities to file for bankruptcy,
it “invites the intervention of the bankruptcy power to save its agency
which the State itself is powerless to rescue.”111 The Court added that it is
through the state’s “cooperation with the national government [that] the
needed relief is given.”112
Chapter 9 incorporates state- and local-government law principles.
Acknowledging that cities are creatures of their states, the Bankruptcy
Code requires specific state authorization before a city can file for
bankruptcy.113 The specific-authorization requirement is grounded in the
108. See, e.g., Dawson, supra note 73, at 30 (arguing that although the proscription
against unfair discrimination should mean the same thing in municipal and corporate
bankruptcy, a court should grant more flexibility to a municipal debtor in light of the
structure and purpose of Chapter 9); Hynes & Walt, supra note 73 (discussing the conflict
between retirees and bondholders in Chapter 9 cases); C. Scott Pryor, Municipal
Bankruptcy: When Doing Less is Doing Best, 88 AM. BANKR. L.J. 85 (2014) (discussing the
Chapter 9 plan confirmation standards through the lens of the Stockton, California,
bankruptcy case).
109. See, e.g., Clayton P. Gillette, Fiscal Federalism, Political Will, and Strategic Use of
Municipal Bankruptcy, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 283, 297 (2012) (suggesting that once a state
authorizes its municipalities to file for Chapter 9, it may invite undesirable strategic
behavior on the part of a distressed municipality); Omer Kimhi, Chapter 9 of the
Bankruptcy Code: A Solution in Search of a Problem, 27 YALE J. ON REG. 351, 353–54
(2010) (arguing that “bankruptcy law, at least in its current form, is not a sensible solution
for urban economic crises”); Michael W. McConnell & Randal C. Picker, When Cities Go
Broke: A Conceptual Introduction to Municipal Bankruptcy, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 425, 494
(1993) (identifying the grounding premise of Chapter 9 as the notion that all distressed cities
need is relief from their current creditors).
110. See Moringiello, Goals and Governance, supra note 21, at 450–51.
111. United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27, 54 (1938).
112. Id.
113. 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(2) (2012).
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Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which states that
“[t]he powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to
the people.”114 Although the law governing the relationship between cities
and their states provides the design of Chapter 9, few scholars have
explored in depth the role of state choices in the interpretation of the
Chapter 9 confirmation standards.115
If corporate structure and the nature of individuals influence the
bankruptcy rules that apply to those types of debtors, municipal structure
and the laws governing that structure should have some influence on the
interpretation of Chapter 9’s provisions. Although a municipality is an
entity, its capital, management structure, and duties differ from those of a
business entity. A city must provide basic municipal services, and relies in
large part on taxes to do so. Its ability to tax is limited both by caps
imposed by state law and by economic and demographic realities.116
Moreover, a city’s capital structure does not include equity securities.
Instead, it issues only debt securities to finance its obligations.117 Unlike a
business entity, a city cannot make the decision to wind down an
unprofitable division or to cease doing business entirely.118 Although a
municipality can merge with a surrounding municipality or be dissolved
into its surrounding county, its ability to do so is governed by state law,
which might not permit a municipality to change its structure in the way
that its population might desire.119 Municipal managers may be less

114. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
115. There are exceptions. See generally Michelle Wilde Anderson, The New Minimal
Cities, 123 YALE L.J. 1118, 1122 (2014) [hereinafter Anderson, Minimal Cities]
(characterizing the identification of the appropriate level of municipal services in an
insolvent city as a humanitarian question, as well as a doctrinal challenge); C. Scott Pryor,
Who Bears the Burden? The Place for Participation of Municipal Residents in Chapter 9,
37 CAMPBELL L. REV. 161 (2015) (discussing the role of municipal residents in the
determination of whether a plan of adjustment is feasible).
116. Christine Sgarlata Chung, Government Budgets as the Hunger Games: The Brutal
Competition for State and Local Government Resources Given Municipal Securities Debt,
Pension and OBEP Obligations, and Taxpayer Needs, 33 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 663,
676–78 (2014) (noting that the overwhelming tax burden shouldered by residents of Detroit
is one factor that makes tax increases unrealistic).
117. Id. at 683.
118. Christine Sgarlata Chung, Zombieland/The Detroit Bankruptcy: Why Debts
Associated with Pensions, Benefits, and Municipal Securities Never Die . . . and How They
Are Killing Cities Like Detroit, 41 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 771, 779–80 (2014).
119. See Michelle Wilde Anderson, Dissolving Cities, 121 YALE L.J. 1364, 1375–84
(2012) [hereinafter Anderson, Dissolving Cities] (explaining the range of dissolution laws,
and explaining that some states limit the ability to dissolve to municipalities with very small
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sophisticated than those of business entities; particularly in smaller- and
medium-sized municipalities, officials tend to serve on a part-time or
volunteer basis.120 Either because of a lack of sophistication or short-term
political motivations, public entities overextend themselves with debt in
ways similar to some consumers.121
Courts have articulated the purposes of municipal bankruptcy in a way
that illustrates the distinct role and structure of municipal entities. In some
respects, the goal of Chapter 9 is the same as that of Chapter 11: to allow
the debtor to have some breathing room, free from creditor collection
efforts, to work out a plan to pay its creditors.122 In others, the goals of
Chapter 9 diverge from those of Chapter 11. At least one court read the
legislative history of Chapter 9 to imply that municipal bankruptcy law was
not designed to balance the rights of the municipal debtor and its creditors,
but rather “to meet the special needs of a municipal debtor.”123 Those
special needs include the need to remain in existence rather than
liquidate,124 and the need to continue providing public services. 125
The remainder of this Article discusses the skeletal architecture of
Chapter 9 and the status of a municipality as a creature of its state within
the framework of two plan confirmation concepts. The first, found in the
requirement that the plan be in the best interests of creditors, is that there is

populations, and that others, like Pennsylvania, do not provide for dissolution at all because
the state has no unincorporated land).
120. Charles Chieppo, Fixing Municipal Finance, By the Book, GOVERNING (Sept. 20,
2012), http://www.governing.com/blogs/bfc/col-municipal-finance-pioneer-institute-guidesound-fiscal-management.html (reporting that municipal officials and members of
municipal finance committees often serve on a volunteer basis, particularly in small and
medium-sized communities); Stephan Whitaker, Financial Innovations and Issuer
Sophistication in Municipal Securities Markets 6–7 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Cleveland,
Working Paper No. 14-04, 2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2446979 (explaining that municipal-securities issuers range from small entities
with part-time elected officials and no staff to states that hire finance professionals with
advanced degrees).
121. See David A. Skeel, Jr., Is Bankruptcy the Answer for Troubled Cities and States?,
50 HOUS. L. REV. 1063, 1074 (2013) [hereinafter Skeel, Answer] (analogizing state financial
distress to that of individuals and suggesting that Congress might, in a bankruptcy chapter
for states, assert similar controls over a state, such as a proscription against serial filing, as it
does over individuals); David A. Skeel, Jr., When Should Bankruptcy Be an Option (for
People, Places, or Things)?, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2217, 2228 (2014) [hereinafter Skeel,
Option] (illustrating the similarities between the justifications for consumer bankruptcy and
those for state bankruptcy).
122. In re Addison Cmty. Hosp. Auth., 175 B.R. 646, 649 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1994).
123. In re Richmond Unified Sch. Dist., 133 B.R. 221, 225 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1991).
124. In re Addison Cmty. Hosp. Auth., 175 B.R. at 650.
125. In re Mount Carbon Metro. Dist., 242 B.R. 18, 41 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1999).

http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol37/iss1/4

20

Moringiello: Chapter 9 Plan Confirmation Standards and the Role of State Choic

2015]

CHAPTER 9 PLAN CONFIRMATION STANDARDS

91

some minimum amount that must be distributed to each creditor. The
second concept is equality, which runs through the requirements that a plan
must be fair and equitable, and that it not discriminate unfairly. Although
courts appreciate that the principles applicable in corporate and individual
bankruptcy are of “limited assistance” in Chapter 9, the guiding Chapter 9
principles remain elusive.126 Both of these concepts, as applied to a city as
the debtor, raise broad questions about the rights of creditors in municipal
property, the underexplored role of state decision-making in Chapter 9, and
the meaning of bankruptcy in the municipal context.
III.

PLAN CONFIRMATION STANDARDS AND THE ROLE OF THE STATE
IN A CITY’S REHABILITATION

Although municipal bankruptcy law was originally conceived to
provide federal enhancement to state municipal rehabilitation efforts, the
role of state choices in the bankruptcy process has not been well
articulated. This Part identifies areas where the ambiguity and omissions in
Chapter 9 may permit a court to defer to state choices in determining
whether a Chapter 9 plan of adjustment satisfies the Code’s confirmation
requirements.
A.

Best Interests and the Distributional Goals of Chapter 9

The best interests test provides a floor for distributions to creditors in
bankruptcy.127 The property of business entities and individuals is
available to satisfy creditor claims. The distributional baseline in Chapters
11 and 13, therefore, is the liquidation value of the debtor’s assets.128
Those chapters require that each creditor receive at least the baseline
amount.129 The Chapter 9 best interests test does not refer to individual
claims; rather, it simply requires that the plan be “in the best interests of
creditors.”130 All courts acknowledge that Chapter 9’s distributional
baseline is not the liquidation of municipal assets, but they have not
identified an alternative baseline other than a vague dismissal analysis.131

126. In re Richmond Unified Sch. Dist., 133 B.R. at 225 (“[T]he principles that apply in
the other chapters of the Bankruptcy Code are of limited assistance in construing of Chapter
9.”).
127. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
128. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
129. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1129(a)(7)(A)(ii), 1325(a)(4) (2012).
130. Id. § 943(b)(7).
131. See supra notes 48–53 and accompanying text.
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The dismissal analysis is unworkable because it is impossible to
predict how creditors would fare outside of bankruptcy, either upon
dismissal or if bankruptcy had never happened. Even states with
intervention statutes often take no active role in resolving a city’s distress
until a bankruptcy filing appears imminent. The Detroit Grand Bargain
could have happened without a bankruptcy filing, but it was not until
Detroit filed that both the state and foundations offered money to shield the
art from the city’s creditors.132 Likewise, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania,
resolved its debts outside of bankruptcy with rigorous and sometimes
controversial state oversight, but the state implemented the structures
supporting that oversight only after Harrisburg’s failed bankruptcy filing.133
Moreover, the nonbankruptcy entitlements of important municipal creditors
remain unsettled. Some states have constitutional protections for pensions,
yet the impact of those protections in a default scenario is untested.134
Likewise, although participants in the municipal bond market have long
assumed that a pledge of a municipality’s taxing power to support a general
obligation bond was the equivalent of a security interest, the principal
collection remedy available to bondholders is a mandamus action to
compel the levy and collection of sufficient taxes to pay the bonds, and the
efficacy of that remedy is uncertain at best.135
If the value of a city’s assets is irrelevant, then perhaps the correct
baseline for the best interests test is the amount that the city needs to spend
on its services. This approach reflects a similarity between consumer
bankruptcy and municipal bankruptcy.136 Like an individual, a municipality
132. See Brent Snavely, The 10 Key Events that Helped Detroit Exit Bankruptcy,
DETROIT FREE PRESS (Nov. 10, 2014, 12:01 AM), http://www.freep.com/story/news/local/
detroit-bankruptcy/2014/11/09/detroit-bankruptcy-events/18722223/ (explaining that the
discussions that led to the Grand Bargain began four months after Detroit filed its
bankruptcy petition).
133. Moringiello, Goals and Governance, supra note 21, at 471–78.
134. See In re City of Detroit, 504 B.R. 97, 149–54 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013)
(explaining the history of Michigan’s constitutional pension protection).
135. See NAT’L ASS’N OF BOND LAWYERS, GENERAL OBLIGATION BONDS: STATE LAW,
BANKRUPTCY AND DISCLOSURE CONSIDERATIONS 11–12 (2014), http://www.nabl.org/upload
s/cms/documents/GENERAL_OBLIGATION_MUNICIPAL_BONDS.pdf.
136. Others have suggested similarities between the goals of consumer bankruptcy and
the goals of municipal bankruptcy and sovereign bankruptcy. See, e.g., McConnell &
Picker, supra note 109, at 468–71 (surmising that the goal of Chapter 9 might be more akin
to the fresh start for individuals than to the operational restructuring supported by Chapter
11); Robert K. Rasmussen, Integrating a Theory of the State into Sovereign Debt
Restructuring, 53 EMORY L.J. 1159, 1179–85 (2004) (explaining that the law of individual
bankruptcy could inform sovereign debt restructuring because the effect of sovereign
financial distress could have an impact on citizens that is similar to their own financial
distress); Skeel, Answer, supra note 121, at 1074 (analogizing state financial distress to that
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must continue in existence, satisfying basic needs.137 Just as bankruptcy
law requires an individual to pay creditors only an amount that exceeds her
necessary expenses,138 a best interests test that takes necessary city services
into account might better accommodate the nature of a city that must
provide services to its residents. This analysis raises two more questions.
The first is whether the value of municipal property is always irrelevant to
a best interests analysis. The second asks how the appropriate level of city
services should be determined.
1.

The Relevance (or Not) of Municipal Assets

It is often said that creditors outside of bankruptcy may not seize
municipal assets to satisfy debts.139 If this is true, then even if Detroit, as
owner of its art, can sell it free from any trust restrictions,140 creditors have
no nonbankruptcy expectancy interest in the art. This immunity from
creditor process is one that is often stated but thinly supported. Case law
on the issue is old and scant, and the legal foundation for immunizing
municipal assets from seizure by creditors is based on the theory that a
municipality holds its assets in public trust for its residents.141 Courts
protecting municipal property under this public trust doctrine have
distinguished between property that the city holds for its own private uses
and that which the city holds for the public,142 but they tend to take an
expansive view of public use. One court described protected property as
that property “absolutely essential to the existence of the public
of individuals and suggesting that Congress might, in a bankruptcy chapter for states, assert
similar controls over a state, such as a proscription against serial filing, as it does over
individuals); Skeel, Option, supra note 121, at 2228 (illustrating the similarities between the
justifications for consumer bankruptcy and those for state bankruptcy).
137. Sepinuck, supra note 67, at 351 (citing the individual’s need to satisfy basic needs
as one reason that the Chapter 13 unfair discrimination test should be different from that in
Chapter 11).
138. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1) (2012).
139. McConnell & Picker, supra note 109, at 433–34.
140. The Michigan Attorney General has argued that the city has no such right. See
Conveyance or Transfer of Detroit Institute of Arts Collection, Mich. Op. Att’y Gen. No.
7272, at 13 (June 13, 2013), available at http://media.mlive.com/news/detroit_impact/
other/AGO %207272.pdf.
141. Little River Bank & Trust Co. v. Johnson, 141 So. 141, 143 (Fla. 1932) (citing City
of Oakland v. Oakland Water-Front Co., 50 P. 277, 286 (Cal. 1897); City of Alton v. Ill.
Transp. Co., 12 Ill. 38, 60 (1850); City of Salem v. Lane & Bodley Co., 90 Ill. App. 560,
563 (1900); Carter v. Louisiana, 8 So. 836, 836 (La. 1890); Egerton v. Third Municipality of
New Orleans, 1 La. Ann. 435, 437–38 (La. 1846); Darling v. Mayor of Balt., 51 Md. 1, 11–
12 (1879)).
142. Meriwether v. Garrett, 102 U.S. 472, 513 (1880); HOWARD S. ABBOTT, A TREATISE
ON THE LAW OF PUBLIC SECURITIES 715–18 (1913).
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corporation, or necessary and useful to the exercise and performance of
governmental powers, or the performance of governmental duties.”143
There is one clear outer limit. When a municipality holds property only for
investment or sale, a court will allow seizure of that property to satisfy
claims against the municipality.144
The Detroit case threatened to test the public trust theory. Detroit’s
emergency manager Kevyn Orr believed that creditors would claim an
entitlement to the DIA artwork, a fear that proved to be correct.145
Although courts in municipal bankruptcy cases have accepted the public
trust doctrine, they have done so primarily in cases involving specialpurpose municipalities.146 Shielding all municipal assets from creditor
reach makes sense when the debtor is an irrigation district; seizure of the
assets would mean termination of an entity created by the state to provide
services to the public. A rule denying creditors access to all municipal
assets makes less sense when a city is the debtor, especially when the city
owns artwork worth hundreds of millions of dollars.147
Even if creditors cannot force a municipality to sell assets, the
municipality may do so voluntarily. If it does so in a Chapter 9 case, the
court will consider the sale price in applying the best interests test.148 In re
Barnwell County Hospital149 was one of two simultaneously filed Chapter 9
cases designed to culminate in the privatization of two county hospitals.150
In holding that the plan of adjustment met the best interests test, the court
first acknowledged the complex nature of the case, and then found that the
test was satisfied because the debtor had received a fair price for its
hospital assets, the proceeds would be distributed to the debtor’s creditors,
and the debtor would be able to sell the hospital as a going concern.151
Important to the court’s best interests determination was the fact that the

143. Little River Bank & Trust Co., 141 So. at 143.
144. City of New Orleans v. Home Mut. Ins. Co., 23 La. Ann. 61, 62 (La. 1871).
145. Nathan Bomey et al., How Detroit Was Reborn: The Inside Story of Detroit’s
Historic Bankruptcy Case, DETROIT FREE PRESS, http://www.freep.com/longform/news/
local/detroit-bankruptcy/2014/11/09/detroit-bankruptcy-rosen-orr-snyder/18724267/
(last visited Jan. 17, 2015).
146. See, e.g., Lorber v. Vista Irrigation Dist., 127 F.2d 628, 637 (9th Cir. 1942)
(quoting Newhouse v. Corcoran Irrigation Dist., 114 F.2d 690, 690–91 (9th Cir. 1940)).
147. For that reason, objecting creditors in Detroit have asked the court to distinguish
between property that is essential for public service and that which is not. See Financial
Guaranty Insurance Co.’s Pretrial Brief, supra note 13.
148. In re Barnwell Cnty. Hosp., 471 B.R. 849, 869 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2012).
149. Id.
150. Id. at 853.
151. Id. at 869.
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plan preserved healthcare services in the affected county.152 Thus, the court
considered the purpose of the municipality and the needs of the residents in
determining that the value received by the debtor was sufficient to satisfy
the best interests test.153
Detroit’s Grand Bargain raised both the question of the availability of
municipal assets to satisfy creditor claims and that of the appropriate
valuation of those assets if the debtor chooses to monetize them.
Ultimately, Detroit did not shield its assets from creditors. It monetized its
art collection through the Grand Bargain,154 and parted with several real
property assets in its settlements with its financial creditors.155 As a result,
the question of whether all municipal assets are truly immune from creditor
process remains unanswered. The public trust doctrine, by shielding assets
“necessary and useful” to a city’s exercise of its public powers, should
allow the city, and its state, to determine the assets necessary for the
success of a city’s future. The bankruptcy court does not, and should not,
engage in urban planning. Only the municipality, either through choices
made by its own local government or through choices made by the state in
cooperation with the city, can guide the structural rehabilitation of a city,
and municipal assets play a key role in any such rehabilitation.
2.

Determining a City’s Necessary Expenditures

Today’s distressed cities reflect the economic and racial fragmentation
of many American metropolitan regions: the affluent residents are in the
suburbs and the poor populate the urban core.156 Poor, shrinking cities may
have small governments that are unable to provide any level of services
beyond basic public safety. This reality has led to a call for enhanced
state–local cooperation in ameliorating municipal problems.157 Only a state
can decide whether to keep a municipality in existence, and it may be the
case that smaller municipalities should be absorbed into a larger

152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Detroit Confirmation Opinion, supra note 9, at 12–13 (discussing the settlement
made with the Detroit Institute of Arts wherein the DIA will make $100 million in
contributions to pensions over the next twenty years and other charitable organizations will
contribute $366 million to the pension programs in exchange for the art within the museum
to be transferred to a corporation that will hold the art in perpetual trust for the benefit of the
citizens of Michigan).
155. Id. at 17–19 (explaining the city’s settlements with Syncora and FGIC).
156. See Anderson, Minimal Cities, supra note 115, at 1136–41; Richard Briffault, Our
Localism: Part II—Localism and Legal Theory, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 346, 446 (1990).
157. See Anderson, Minimal Cities, supra note 115, at 1217–18; Briffault, supra note
156, at 453.
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municipality better able to provide basic services.158 There is no agreement
on the appropriate level of municipal services, and there cannot be, without
considering the type of city and the goals of such services.
A bankruptcy court might defer to state choices. A state could decide
what property is necessary for a distressed city based on its goals in
supporting the rehabilitation of that city. In Detroit, the state, by
participating in the Grand Bargain, made a decision about the necessity of
the art to Detroit’s recovery, and about the appropriate value of the art
given the state’s desire that the art remain in Detroit.159 The court agreed
with the state’s choices in finding that the plan of adjustment satisfied the
best interests test, citing the role that the DIA collection plays in the city’s
values of culture, education, civic pride, regional cooperation, and
economic development.160 The Detroit plan illustrates that monetization of
city assets may be crucial to a successful plan, but that a city or state’s
choices about how to monetize the assets will likely be honored by a court.
Nothing in Chapter 9 explicitly requires a court to honor these decisions,
but the history of municipal bankruptcy law indicates that a high level of
deference is appropriate.
B.

Are Municipal Creditors More Equal Than Others?
1.

What is the Meaning of Bankruptcy?

If municipal bankruptcy law was originally designed to facilitate a
state’s efforts to rescue a municipality, one could argue that the bankruptcy
court may only rubber stamp a state’s choices with respect to the treatment
of a municipality’s creditors. If that is true, there should be no problem
with the Grand Bargain—if Detroit wants to save its art, and pay its
pensioners, it can. Chapter 9 preserves a state’s powers over its cities. The
legislative history to the Code explains that § 904 reinforces the Chapter 9
policy against interference with municipal affairs by stating that a
bankruptcy court “may not interfere with the choices a municipality makes
as to what services and benefits it will provide to its inhabitants.”161 The
“bankruptcy court as rubber stamp” position is an extreme one, however,
and it ignores the fact that the state, having failed to rehabilitate its
distressed municipality on its own, resorted to a federal process to do so.
That federal process has always placed conditions on debtors. Those

158. Anderson, Dissolving Cities, supra note 119, at 1367 (asserting that municipal
dissolution may have an appropriate place in the life cycle of cities).
159. See Detroit Confirmation Opinion, supra note 9, at 10–12.
160. Id. at 23–24.
161. H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 398 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6354.
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conditions include the plan confirmation standards; when an individual or
entity debtor files for bankruptcy, it gives up the right to make unbounded
choices about how much it will pay each creditor. Up to this point, I have
emphasized the state side of the municipal bankruptcy equation. Below, I
address the federal side.
In considering Chapter 9 in its deliberations preceding the Code’s
enactment in 1978, Congress recognized that the term “bankruptcy,” as
applied to municipalities, is not bankruptcy as we know it in the corporate
and consumer sense. The legislative history acknowledges that “the term
‘bankruptcy’ in its strict sense is really a misnomer for a [C]hapter 9
case.”162 The legislative history of the Code could be read to give a
municipal debtor enormous leeway in developing a plan. The House
Report acknowledged that a municipality does not liquidate its assets to
satisfy creditor claims, and concluded that the “primary purpose of
[C]hapter 9 is to allow the municipal unit to continue operating while it
adjusts or refinances creditor claims.”163
Must bankruptcy incorporate equal treatment? The Constitution gives
Congress the power to enact uniform bankruptcy laws,164 and the Supreme
Court has held that municipal bankruptcy is within that power.165 State
debtor–creditor law can adequately address the relationship between a
defaulting debtor and one creditor, but bankruptcy’s proper role is in
adjusting a debtor’s relationship with multiple creditors. Bankruptcy law
does not, in fact, treat all creditors equally; all chapters other than Chapter
9 are rife with priority provisions. For instance, in both consumer and
corporate bankruptcy, creditors that are deemed less able to spread the risk
of the debtor’s financial failure, such as ex-spouses, children, and
employees, receive priority in payment.166
There must be some significance to the state’s choice to opt for
bankruptcy for its distressed city, however. Municipal bankruptcy came
into existence because states were powerless to solve the problems of their
municipalities on their own.167 The federal system allows cities to impair
their contracts and to impose payment plans upon nonconsenting
creditors.168 The definition of bankruptcy, however, informs the content of
a plan of adjustment. Bankruptcy law should not give states (or cities, if
162. Id. at 263, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6221.
163. Id.
164. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
165. See United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27, 54 (1938).
166. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(1)(A) (2012).
167. See supra notes 25–26 and accompanying text.
168. See 11 U.S.C. § 901 (incorporating the cramdown provision of § 1129(b) by
reference).
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the state, like California, takes a hands-off approach to municipal financial
distress) unlimited discretion as to the amount that creditors are paid.
By permitting a municipality to file for bankruptcy, a state consents to
a federal procedure. This federal procedure is distinguished by several
attributes. It is collective, it culminates in a discharge of some or all of the
debtor’s unpaid obligations, and it is facilitated and governed by federal
law.169 One author has placed only two limits on the congressional power
to enact a bankruptcy law: the law must deal with insolvent debtors, and it
must adjust relationships only between the debtor and its creditors, to the
exclusion of third-party interests.170 Although businesses and individuals
need not be insolvent to file for bankruptcy, a municipality must be.171
Therefore, because a city that files for bankruptcy, by definition, cannot
pay all of its bills in full, Chapter 9 assumes some adjustment of debts.
Adjustment, however, implies some measure of equality.172 Chapter 9
embraces notions of equality in its incorporation of preference-avoidance
powers and strong-arm powers.173 Early in the life of the federal law of
municipal bankruptcy, the Supreme Court stated that municipal bankruptcy
law “envisage[d] equality of treatment of creditors.”174
The argument that a state can fashion bankruptcy rules, unbounded by
any federal power, is not supported by the cases interpreting Chapter 9.
Although states have considerable leeway in conditioning their
municipalities’ entry into Chapter 9, courts have placed a limit on that
discretion: once a state has authorized a Chapter 9 filing, it may not “cherry
pick” among the Bankruptcy Code’s provisions.175 Judge Rhodes gave one
example of such prohibited cherry picking in the Detroit eligibility opinion
when he stated that if the state had conditioned Detroit’s filing on a

169. Skeel, Option, supra note 121, at 2222–23.
170. Thomas E. Plank, The Constitutional Limits of Bankruptcy, 63 TENN. L. REV. 487,
492 (1996).
171. 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(3).
172. G. Eric Brunstad, Jr., Bankruptcy and the Problems of Economic Futility: A Theory
on the Unique Role of Bankruptcy Law, 55 BUS. LAW. 499, 525 (2000).
173. 11 U.S.C. § 109(c) (allowing a municipality to bypass the requirement that it
negotiate with its creditors if a creditor may attempt to obtain a transfer that may be
avoidable as a preference); id. § 901 (incorporating §§ 544 and 547).
174. Am. United Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. City of Avon Park, 311 U.S. 138, 147 (1940).
175. Mission Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Texas, 116 F.2d 175, 176–78 (5th Cir. 1940); In re City
of Stockton, 475 B.R. 720, 727–29 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2012); In re City of Vallejo, 403 B.R.
72, 75–76 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2009), aff’d, 432 B.R. 262 (E.D. Cal. 2010); Cnty. of Orange v.
Merrill Lynch & Co. (In re Cnty. of Orange) 191 B.R. 1005, 1021–22 (Bankr. C.D. Cal.
1996).
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promise to pay its pension obligations in full, that condition would likely
have been invalid.176
Even in Chapter 9, which, for constitutional reasons, explicitly honors
many state choices, a state law is preempted if it conflicts with federal
bankruptcy law.177 The state has a choice: prohibit its municipalities from
filing for bankruptcy, or permit them to file, and thus, subject them to the
Bankruptcy Code “as is,” unmodified by state preferences. Because of the
skeletal nature of Chapter 9, however, there are questions as to what “as is”
means. Although municipal bankruptcy law today is far more
comprehensive and detailed than it was in the 1930s,178 Chapter 9, because
of its ambiguous confirmation standards and almost nonexistent priority
scheme, leaves ample room for the exercise of state discretion.
2.

Some Thoughts on the Lack of a Chapter 9 Priority Scheme

In both the Detroit and Stockton bankruptcies, the court approved a
plan of adjustment that gave different payment percentages to creditors that
appeared to have equal priority as unsecured creditors.179 Several authors
have discussed whether Chapter 9 permits such disparate treatment, with
conclusions ranging from yes, because the pension creditors are more
sympathetic than the bond insurers,180 to maybe, if the court interprets the
confirmation standards in light of the unique purpose of Chapter 9,181 to no,
because the Code does not contain a specific priority for pension
claimants.182

176. In re City of Detroit, 504 B.R. 97, 162 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013).
177. In re Cnty. of Orange, 191 B.R. at 1017 (citing Elliot v. Bumb, 356 F.2d 749, 755
(9th Cir. 1966)).
178. See generally Lawrence P. King, Municipal Insolvency: The New Chapter IX of the
Bankruptcy Act, 1976 DUKE L.J. 1157, 1157–58 (explaining the changes made in 1976 to
municipal bankruptcy law to accommodate the possibility that a large city might file).
179. See generally Detroit Confirmation Opinion, supra note 9; Stech & Fitzpatrick,
supra note 17.
180. See Jack M. Beermann, The Public Pension Crisis, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3, 92
(2013) (arguing that generally, the “human case in favor of a [pension] bailout is
compelling”); David A. Skeel, Jr., Can Pensions Be Restructured in (Detroit’s) Municipal
Bankruptcy? 19 (Federalist Soc’y, White Paper, 2013), available at http://www.fed-soc.org
/publications/detail/can-pensions-be-restructured-in-detroits-municipal-bankruptcy.
181. Dawson, supra note 73, at 33 (arguing that higher payouts for pension creditors
could be justified under a new value rule that recognizes the unique characteristics of
municipal bankruptcy).
182. Hynes & Walt, supra note 79, at 660 (explaining that in the absence of a property
right under state law or an enumerated bankruptcy priority status, pension creditors cannot
be elevated over other unsecured creditors in Chapter 9).
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Very little has been written on the absence of priorities from Chapter
9, and there is no legislative history explaining their omission.183 Only one
category of claim, the administrative expense claim, is entitled to statutory
priority in Chapter 9.184 Maybe Chapter 9 should incorporate priorities.
On the other hand, perhaps the Tenth Amendment limits the ability of
Congress to prescribe Chapter 9 priorities.185 The omission leads to two
possible conclusions—that there is even more equality among Chapter 9
creditors than there is among Chapter 11 creditors, or that the priority
decision is left to someone else, the city, or its state.
As explained above, Congress drafted Chapter 9 and its predecessors
to respect state sovereignty.186 The skeletal structure of Chapter 9 omits a
number of Chapter 11 provisions that give the court and creditors some
control over a debtor. Omitted provisions include the power of a court to
appoint a trustee in the event of debtor mismanagement and the power of a
court to approve the sale of the debtor’s property.187 Those management
powers are also explicitly denied to the court by the operation of § 904.
Can § 903 be read to require a court to honor a state’s priority choices in a
plan of adjustment?
At first glance, the answer seems obviously to be no. Several courts
have ruled that state statutes preferring one set of creditors over another fall
away in bankruptcy via the Supremacy Clause and the Bankruptcy
Clause.188 In the Detroit eligibility opinion, Judge Rhodes made it very
clear that a state law immunizing a category of debt from impairment
would not be enforceable in bankruptcy.189 That holding reflects one
universally accepted purpose of bankruptcy law: the impairment of
contracts.190 The inability of a state to impair contracts is the entire raison

183. See Dawson, supra note 73, at 6.
184. 11 U.S.C. § 943(b)(5) (2012) (requiring that claims under § 507(a)(2), which
provides statutory priority for administrative expenses under § 503(b), be paid cash for such
claim on the effective date of the plan).
185. U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to
the people.”).
186. See supra notes 25–37 and accompanying text.
187. See 11 U.S.C. § 901 (omitting §§ 363 and 1104).
188. See supra notes 172–76 and accompanying text.
189. In re City of Detroit, 504 B.R. 97, 161 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013) (“[I]f a state
consents to a municipal bankruptcy, no state law can protect contractual pension rights from
impairment in bankruptcy, just as no law could protect any other types of contract rights.”).
190. Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. 122, 191 (1819).
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d’être of municipal bankruptcy law;191 if a state could resolve the problems
of its cities on its own, there would be no reason for a federal statute
permitting the impairment of contracts.
One of the creditors in the Orange County bankruptcy argued that the
absence of bankruptcy priorities in Chapter 9 meant that state statutory
priorities controlled in bankruptcy.192 The court’s response to this
argument illustrates the tension between a state’s ability to control its
municipalities and the existence of a federal law governing municipal
bankruptcy. The court conceded that Congress excluded the Code’s
priorities for employee wages and benefits from Chapter 9 because, by
affecting a municipality’s relationship with its employees, those priorities
would interfere with the ability of a municipality to govern its
operations.193 The court also stressed that allowing a state to rewrite
priorities would make the best interests of creditors test, as applied in
Chapter 9, hard to satisfy, presumably because if state law applied in
bankruptcy, the creditors’ distribution in bankruptcy would be identical to
their distribution if the case were dismissed.194
Supremacy Clause considerations aside, it makes sense that a state
cannot export its own priority scheme into Chapter 9. Bankruptcy is
designed to resolve the debts of an insolvent debtor in a collective
proceeding. State laws granting creditor priorities are not drafted with
bankruptcy goals in mind. Once a state has permitted bankruptcy, it has
given up the opportunity to impose those categorical priorities.195 Yet
Chapter 9 preserves the power of a state to control its municipalities in the
exercise of their political and governmental powers.196 In holding that
Detroit was eligible for bankruptcy, Judge Rhodes hinted at the difference
between acknowledging that nonbankruptcy statutory priorities disappear
in bankruptcy and applying the Chapter 9 plan confirmation standards to a
city’s ultimate plan of adjustment.197 Just because a city may impair
pension obligations due to the primacy of federal law over state priorities
does not mean that it must do so. Judge Rhodes made this clear when he
wrote that at plan confirmation time, the requirements of Chapter 9 will
191. United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27, 54 (1938); Ashton v. Cameron Cnty. Water
Improvement Dist. No. 1, 298 U.S. 513, 530 (1936); Ass’n of Retired Emps. v. City of
Stockton (In re City of Stockton), 478 B.R. 8, 16 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2012).
192. Cnty. of Orange v. Merrill Lynch & Co. (In re Cnty. of Orange), 191 B.R. 1005,
1019–20 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1996).
193. Id. at 1019 n.19.
194. Id. at 1020.
195. See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
196. 11 U.S.C. § 903 (2012).
197. In re City of Detroit, 504 B.R. 97, 154 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013).
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require the court’s “judicious legal and equitable consideration of the
interests of the City and all of its creditors, as well as the laws of the State
of Michigan.”198
Chapter 9 leaves debtor governance to the states.199 Some states, such
as California, have no municipal fiscal oversight programs, but others, such
as Pennsylvania and Michigan, anticipate that the state will have an
oversight role in a Chapter 9 case.200 Perhaps the omission of priorities
from Chapter 9 means that a bankruptcy court should defer to a state’s
choice in prioritizing creditors if the state makes that choice in connection
with the bankruptcy case after considering the rehabilitation needs of the
municipality. In approving Detroit’s plan, which provided for a higher
payout to pension claimants than to other unsecured creditors, Judge
Rhodes applied a test that reflects this approach. He described the higher
payout as justified by the city’s mission as a municipal-service enterprise,
and by the state’s message, expressed in its laws that were displaced by
Chapter 9, that the rights of pension creditors are distinct from other
unsecured claims.201
There are several possible objections to the position that a state’s
priority choices in formulating a plan of adjustment deserve deference.
The first is based on the scant commentary to the Chapter 9 discharge
section, which implies that the debtor can choose to except a debt from
discharge in its plan.202 No opinions have analyzed this section, and the
little commentary that exists on the section cautions courts from fashioning
discharge exceptions on a case-by-case basis.203
Another objection, raised in the Orange County bankruptcy case, is
based on uniformity. The court in County of Orange was concerned about
uniformity among states in applying the Bankruptcy Code.204 That hurdle
is easily overcome; the constitutional requirement of uniform bankruptcy
laws is generally understood to require that all debtors within a state be

198. Id. The court in the Stockton case came to a similar conclusion, and despite a
statement one month before confirmation that bankruptcy law trumped a state law protecting
CalPERS, the court ultimately honored the city’s choice not to impair its obligations to
CalPERS. See Stech & Fitzpatrick, supra note 17.
199. 11 U.S.C. § 903.
200. See Moringiello, Goals and Governance, supra note 21, at 468–78 (discussing the
oversight roles contemplated by Michigan and Pennsylvania).
201. Detroit Confirmation Opinion, supra note 9, at 30–31.
202. 11 U.S.C. § 944(c).
203. 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 944.04, at 944-10 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J.
Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2014).
204. Cnty. of Orange v. Merrill Lynch & Co. (In re Cnty. of Orange), 191 B.R. 1005,
1020 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1996).
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treated in a uniform manner.205 This intrastate uniformity requirement is
the more difficult hurdle. If state statutes are rendered ineffective by the
Supremacy Clause and a state has the ability to fashion different priority
rankings for different cities based on the characteristics of the cities
involved, municipal debtors within a state will not be treated uniformly.
Maybe that is not a cause for concern; municipalities include both specialpurpose districts and the entire range of cities, counties, and towns. A large
city such as Detroit, which entered bankruptcy after decades of industrial
decline and fraught racial relations, has different rehabilitation needs than a
smaller city that might have been forced to file for bankruptcy because of a
corrupt bond deal.
A related objection is based on predictability. Bankruptcy should be
somewhat predictable,206 and allowing a state to make ad hoc choices in
bankruptcy diminishes predictability. Bankruptcy’s predictability must be
balanced against its flexibility, however. Chapter 11 gives debtors
flexibility in classifying creditors, with courts upholding classifications if
they are based on a reasonable purpose.207 States are concerned about
being perceived as predictable and fair in order to maintain credit ratings
for all of their municipalities.208 If the purpose of Chapter 9 is to provide a
minimal amount of federal compulsion to assist states in reviving their
municipalities, then state choices deserve some deference.
Yet another objection is based on precedent that does not allow a court
to grant categorical priorities that contravene the Code’s mandates. The
argument that a court cannot grant a priority in contravention of the Code’s
priority scheme is a compelling one.209 The Supreme Court held in United
States v. Noland210 that a court could not equitably subordinate an entire
category of claims. In the Chapter 9 case of Central Falls, Rhode Island,
however, the court honored a priority fashioned by the state because the
priority was in the form of a lien.211 These two cases imply that a court
205. Hanover Nat’l Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181, 190 (1902).
206. See Comm. on Bankr. & Corporate Reorganization, supra note 59, at 102.
207. 11 U.S.C. § 1122 (incorporated in Chapter 9 by § 901); In re Armstrong World
Indus., Inc., 348 B.R. 136, 159 (D. Del. 2006).
208. Christine Sgarlata Chung, Municipal Securities: The Crisis of State and Local
Government Indebtedness, Systemic Costs of Low Default Rates, and Opportunities for
Reform, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 1455, 1472 (2013); Maria O’Brien Hylton, Central Falls
Retirees v. Bondholders: Assessing Fear of Contagion in Chapter 9 Proceedings, 59
WAYNE L. REV. 525, 544 (2013).
209. For an excellent defense of this position, see Hynes & Walt, supra note 73.
210. United States v. Noland, 517 U.S. 535, 536 (1996).
211. See City of Cent. Falls v. Cent. Falls Teachers’ Union, R.I. Island Counsel 94 (In re
City of Cent. Falls), 468 B.R. 36, 80 (Bankr. D.R.I. 2012); see also David A. Skeel, Jr.,
What is a Lien? Lessons from Municipal Bankruptcy, U. ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015)

Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2015

33

Campbell Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 1 [2015], Art. 4

104

CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37:71

cannot grant a priority to an entire class of claims that is not specifically
granted that priority in the Code, but may honor prebankruptcy property
rights granted by the state to favor a particular class of creditors. This
statement is consistent with the general view of the interaction between
state and federal law in all types of bankruptcy; state law determines
property rights at the moment a bankruptcy petition is filed, and bankruptcy
law determines how those rights are distributed.212 In an early municipal
bankruptcy case, however, courts honored a municipality’s priority choices
as consistent with the requirement that a Chapter 9 plan be fair and
equitable because the favored creditor had given extra value to the
municipality’s reorganization.213
This is where the purpose of Chapter 9 and the role of the state with
respect to its cities meet. When a state agrees to permit a municipality to
file for bankruptcy, it has made the choice to invite federal law to work
together with state efforts to resolve the city’s distress. Michigan did
exactly that when it permitted Detroit to file. Although it could have
engineered the Grand Bargain outside of bankruptcy, it did not.
Bankruptcy provided the impetus for the parties involved in the Grand
Bargain to come to the table. States have a great interest in the bond
ratings for their cities; they know that if they are believed to treat financial
creditors unfairly, they will be punished in the market.214 This is one
reason to leave the in-bankruptcy priority choice to the state; it can decide,
based on the circumstances of the bankruptcy filing, whether it can take the
risk of favoring one class of creditors over another. That is not the role of
bankruptcy law. Although perhaps the Code could dictate priorities
without violating the Tenth Amendment, doing so would not take into
account the unique characteristics of each filing city. Because the state
must continue to provide some level of services to city residents, either by
permitting the city to do so, or by dissolving the city into another municipal
entity, taking the special circumstances of each debtor into account is
appropriate.

(manuscript at 14–15), available at http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=2388&context=faculty_scholarship.
212. Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979).
213. Mason v. Paradise Irrigation Dist., 326 U.S. 536, 541–42 (1946) (citing Ecker v. W.
Pac. R.R. Corp., 318 U.S. 448, 486–87 (1943); Case v. L.A. Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S.
108, 117, 121–22 (1939)).
214. See Hylton, supra note 208, at 544.
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CONCLUSION
Although my position is that the state should fill some of the gaps in
Chapter 9 through its participation in the bankruptcy case, the role of state
choices is murkier in states that do not exercise any oversight over
distressed cities. Chapter 9 leaves debtor governance to the states. Some
states, such as Pennsylvania and Michigan, anticipate that the state is going
to have an oversight role in bankruptcy,215 but others, such as California,
have no municipal fiscal oversight program.216 Stockton received its
Chapter 9 plan approval more than two years after it filed for bankruptcy,217
and another California city, San Bernardino, has been in bankruptcy for
more than two years.218 The most recent California city to complete
Chapter 9, Vallejo, continues to struggle with its pension obligations as a
result of its decision not to challenge CalPERS.219 If the state is a crucial
player in the resolution of municipal financial problems, perhaps a city
should not be permitted to file for bankruptcy without state assistance. The
Bankruptcy Code does not contain that restriction, however. Perhaps such
a city is left to the bankruptcy default rule of equal treatment of creditors.
Or perhaps the city’s choices deserve the same deference as state choices,
and if the state is unhappy with the way its cities conduct Chapter 9 cases,
the state can implement an appropriate municipal fiscal oversight program.
The proper role of Chapter 9 in resolving the distress of a city that files
with no state supervision is one that deserves further study.
Although there are different opinions of the role of bankruptcy law, all
can agree that bankruptcy, as a substantive body of law, does not stand on
its own. It is hard to argue with the statement that bankruptcy law is
challenging because “understanding how it works depends on a mastery of
the broad universe of substantive legal rules that must then be translated
into a new procedural forum.”220 In the municipal bankruptcy sphere, it is
important to understand not only the substantive legal rules under which
See Moringiello, Goals and Governance, supra note 21, at 468–78.
See id.
See Stech & Fitzpatrick, supra note 17.
See Tim Reid, Bankrupt San Bernardino Repaying Millions in Arrears to Calpers,
REUTERS (Nov. 4, 2014, 6:48 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/11/04/us-usamunicipals-sanbernardino-idUSKBN0IO2F120141104.
219. See, e.g., Melanie Hicken, Once Bankrupt, Vallejo Still Can’t Afford Its Pricey
Pensions, CNN MONEY (Mar. 10, 2014, 10:44 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2014/03/10/pf/
vallejo-pensions/; Tim Reid, Two Years After Bankruptcy, California City Again Mired in
Pension Debt, REUTERS (Oct. 1, 2013, 1:06 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/10/
01/usa-municipality-vallejo-idUSL2N0HM05C20131001.
220. Thomas H. Jackson, Translating Assets and Liabilities to the Bankruptcy Forum, 14
J. LEGAL STUD. 73, 114 (1985).
215.
216.
217.
218.
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cities operate, but the various theories of what a city is and should be. The
Detroit confirmation opinion shows us that at least one court has taken the
nature of a city very seriously in determining whether a Chapter 9 plan
could be confirmed—an approach that recognizes that Chapter 9 can be a
useful tool in the municipal recovery toolkit.
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